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enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the 
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PURPOSE STATEMENT 
This publication is by and largely for the academic communities of the twenty-eight colleges and universities of the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. It is published by the Division for Higher Education and Schools of the ELCA. 
The publication presently has its home at Capital University, Columbus, Ohio which has generously offered leadership, 
physical and financial support as an institutional sponsor for the inauguration of the publication. 
The ELCA has frequently sponsored conferences for faculty and administrators which have addressed the church -
college/university partnership. Recently the ELCA has sponsored an annual Vocation of the Lutheran College conference. 
The primary purpose of INTERSECTIONS is to enhance and continue such dialogue. It will do so by: 
* Lifting up the vocation of Lutheran colleges and universities
* Encouraging thoughtful dialogue about the partnership of colleges and universities with the church
* Offering a forum for concerns and interests of faculty at the intersection of faith, learning and teaching
* Raising for debate issues about institutional missions, goals, objectives and learning priorities
* Encouraging critical and productive discussion on our campuses of issues focal to the life of the church
* Serving as a bulletin board for communications among institutions and faculties
* Publishing papers presented at conferences sponsored by the ELCA and its institutions
* Raising the level of awareness among faculty about the Lutheran heritage and connectedness of their institutions, realizing
a sense of being part of a larger family with common interests and concerns.
FROM THE PUBLISHER 
Sometimes it is tough to be a promoter of Lutheran colleges and universities. You run into some jerks in faculty or staff 
positions that don't seem to have a clue about what they are doing and why, or you hear that a dedicated institution just 
finished beating the bushes vigorously for contributions in order to pay their bills and balance their books, and succeeded, 
but now they have to start all over again to find another short term solution. Or you hear from students and parents who have 
been treated poorly by the admissions office at an ELCA school, or meet Lutheran pastors who have no sense of the missions 
of the church colleges and how those missions are linked to the overall ministry of the gospel. You may cry out "How long, 
oh Lord, how long" will I have to push this stone up the mountainside, and like Sisyphus see it roll down, and know that you 
have to push it all the way up again, and again, and again. 
But then you hear the results of the surveys that show how satisfied with their college education the alumni of the Lutheran 
colleges and universities are, and how much more often their college education integrated academic and ethical issues, and 
how they are more active in their churches and service activities than graduates of other institutions. And you attend a 
seminar with a dozen faculty members from ELCA colleges with deep insights into the holistic educational process, and deep 
commitment to the students of their institutions. Or you hear an engaging presentation by.a bishop of the church that captures 
the spirit of Lutheran higher education to a tee. 
And then you hear from someone who has read the book that the Division for Higher Education and Schools has published, 
Lutheran Higher Education -- An Introduction, written by professor Ernie Simmons, and has used it in the development of 
a mission statement for their institution, and now want several copies to distribute to other faculty members. And you get 
calls from people who have read an issue of Intersections, and want to get on the subscriber list, and talk about how 
inspirational a certain article was, and how the journal should be distributed more widely. And the editor of Intersections 
agrees to keep on putting it together, and the university where he works agrees to continue to subsidize it, and you hear that 
there is now enough good material submitted so the journal can be published more often. 
So you know that the stone is not at the bottom of the hill, and that the colleges and universities of the church have made a 
huge difference in thousands of lives, and that some of the programs you work on are successful and do make a big 
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difference, and that they can continue to be offered., .. 
And you feel deeply blessed, and know that the colleges and universities of the ELCA will continue to serve God through 
the services they offer their students, and that the students will be inspired to serve the Lord and their society in their work 
and lives and vocations. Sometimes it is great to be a promoter of Lutheran colleges and universities. 
Ame Selbyg, Director for Colleges and Universities 
FROM THE EDITOR 
This issue borrows everything from other sources. Richard Hughes piece originated as a speech given at the inauguration of 
the new president of Pepperdine University. Nick Wollterstorff sand Storm Bailey's essays originally appeared in Academe,
the journal of the American Association of University Professors, and Catherine McMullen's originated as a talk given at 
Concordia College. Should we apologize for being such blatant borrowers? 
I don't think we need to worry about borrowing. There's something appropriate in faculty recognizing how much they borrow 
from others. Ifwe had to rely only on our own original ideas or words in the classroom, we wouldn't have a whole lot to say. 
More important is how we use what we borrow, how it fits to illustrate the issues at hand; what we are lead to ponder as a 
result, and what we learn from it. 
We've chosen to include these four pieces in this issue of INTERSECTIONS because they focus so well on things of great 
interest to us. It's amazing to me how much Luther has influenced the thinking of Richard Hughes, for exampl�, and the ways 
. in which Lutheran th.emes might, by means of him, come to influence the focus of education at Pepperdine. It's also 
interesting to see how Wolterstorff and Bailey have articulated issues of tremendous practical importance to faculty at all 
of our institutions. Perhaps new faculty at our institutions, by reading these pieces, will overcome some of the common 
misconceptions about what faith related education is all about and how it effects issues like academic freedom. Catherine 
McMullen' s article raises questions for all of our disciplines, not just journalism, and about the relations between the good, 
the bad and the ugly in each of them. 
So, we hope you find these articles to be engaging, helpful, and sometimes at least, worth arguing with. 
Tom Christenson, Capital University 
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THE IDEA OF A CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY 
A Lecture Celebrating the Inauguration of Andrew K. Benton As the Seventh President of Pepperdine 
University: Tuesday, September 19, 2000 
Richard T. Hughes 
Shortly before he left office, David Davenport, the sixth 
president of Pepperdine University, led the entire 
Pepperdine community in the creation of a mission 
statement that affirms the following: 
Pepperdine is a Christian university committed to the 
highest standards of academic excellence and Christian 
values, where students are strengthened for lives of 
purpose, service, and leadership. 
Now, as we celebrate the inauguration of Andrew K. 
Benton as the seventh president of this institution, we must 
ask the question, "What does it mean when we say that 
Pepperdine is a Christian university?" And we must ask as 
well a second question that follows closely on the heels of 
the first: "How can we insure that Pepperdine remains a 
vibrant Christian university for as long as this institution 
shall survive?" 
These are serious questions that we dare not ignore, for 
there are many powerful critics who argue that the idea of 
a Christian university is an oxymoron, a virtual 
contradiction in terms. In their judgment, Christianity is 
restrictive, dogmatic, and exclusive, while the university, 
at its best, celebrates openness, diversity, and an 
unrelenting search for truth. How, then, can one combine 
the ideals of Christianity with the ideals of the academy 
and do so successfully? 
The truth is, there are many outstanding institutions of 
higher learning in the United States that at one time 
embraced a commitment to their Christian moorings, but 
slowly abandoned that commitment as their academic 
stature improved. While Harvard, Yale, and Princeton 
head that list, we could point to scores of other institutions 
that finally abandoned their experiment in Christian higher 
education. 
Today, there are precious few institutions �hat have 
matured into first-rate centers of scholarship and learning 
while maintaining a strong institutional commitment to the 
Christian faith. The critics of Pepperdine's vision, then, 
could easily point to the impressive list of failures in the 
field of Christian higher education as proof that Pepperdine 
will likely fail as well. 
It would be all too easy to ignore those critics as false 
prophets who simply don't understand what Pepperdine is 
all about. But we will make a grave mistake if we choose 
to believe that, somehow, we stand above the powerful 
forces that hastened the collapse of Christian higher 
education atso many other worthy institutions. If scores of 
other institutions have failed to combine the ideals of the 
Christian faith with the ideals of the academy in a 
meaningful way, what makes us think that Pepperdine will 
be an exception to the rule? 
In terms of academic quality, Pepperdine already walks in 
the footprints of many distinguished institutions of higher 
learning in the United States. Indeed, in September, 2000, 
US. News and World Report ranked Pepperdine among 
the top fifty centers of learning in the United States. For a 
university that is slightly more than fifty years old, that is 
cause for considerable pride. 
At the same time, the ranking by US. News and World 
Report is also a cause for sober reflection on how we hope 
to maintain, and even enhance, the Christian character of 
this institution in the years to come. We can make good 
and noble resolutions all we want, but mere talk will not 
get the job done. What we need is a strategy that grows 
from the very heart of this community. 
A STRATEGY OF COMMUNITY•WIDE 
CONVERSATION 
The word "strategy" is in some ways misleading, for I am 
not suggesting that there is some "quick fix" or some 
gimmick that, if propei:ly employed, will keep Pepperdine 
on course. Instead, the strategy I have in mind is a strategy 
of continual theological reflection as, together, week after 
week and year after year, all of us in this community 
undertake the task of exploring what it might mean for 
Pepperdine to thrive as a Christian university. This means 
that we must think long and hard on the question that 
inevitably stands at the very heart of this institution: "How 
can we combine the ideals of the Christian faith with the 
ideals of the academy and do so successfully?" This is the 
question that must frame our thinking and our 
conversation, not just today and not just tomorrow, but for 
as long as this institution shall survive. 
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If we hope that Pepperdine will succeed in this experiment 
in Christian higher education, the conversation on this issue 
must not be confined to a handful of faculty or a core group 
of administrators who have a particular interest in this 
issue. Instead, the conversation must . reach out and 
embrace each and every person in our community--every 
member of the faculty, every person in the administration, 
every person who serves on the Board of Regents, every 
student, and every person who works on the staff of this 
University. 
If the Pepperdine community were to undertake this kind 
of sustained conversation, we just might have a chance to 
take our place among that handful of universities that have 
matured into first-rate centers of scholarship and learning 
while maintaining a strong institutional commitment to the 
Christian faith. 
With this sort of conversation in mind, the Pepperdine 
administration established in October of 1999 the 
Pepperdine University Center for Faith and Learning. The 
administration charged the Center with providing various 
venues for members of this community to think creatively 
on the meaning of Christian higher education. How, for 
example, can Christian faith sustain the life of the mind? 
What does it mean to engage in scholarship that is both 
Christian in orientation but also sensitive to issues of 
diversity? How might we teach from a Christian 
perspective while, at the very same time, enhancing our 
students' abilities to think both critically and 
comparatively? How can responsible Christian scholars 
connect their Christian convictions with their teaching and 
their scholarship in ways that respect the integrity of the 
academic enterprise, the integrity of their disciplines, the 
integrity of their students, and the integrity of the Christian 
faith? Or, to put all these questions in the most succinct 
possible form, how can we combine the ideals of the 
Christian faith with the ideals of the academy and do so 
successfully? 
To fulfill its mandate, the Center is hard at work convening 
seminars and discussion groups where faculty from all five 
schools that make up this University can reflect on these 
kinds of questions. In fact, between May of 1999 and 
September of 2000, a total of 75 Pepperdine faculty 
participated in these seminars. We now seek to extend the 
work of the Center by offering seminars where faculty can 
interact not just with other faculty, but also with students, 
staff, and members of the administration on precisely these 
kinds of issues. 
In time, and with adequate levels of funding, we hope to 
offer grants for some of our very finest scholars who have 
a vision for top-flight, faith-based scholarship. And we 
hope as well to bring to this campus visiting scholars who 
model cutting edge academic work that is grounded in a 
Christian frame of reference. 
In my judgment, there is no more important work at 
Pepperdine University today than the work of the Center 
for Faith and Learning. I say this because the Center's 
work is an investment in the soul of this institution. It is 
not an investment in brick and mortar, though clearly 
without brick and mortar we cannot survive. Instead, the 
work of the Center is an investment in the hearts and minds 
of the people who make up this university. This is the only 
sort of investment that can help insure that Pepperdine will 
move into the future as a Christian university of the very 
highest order. 
I want now to make some suggestions that perhaps will 
contribute to the quality of the conversation that the Center 
seeks to facilitate. 
DIVERSITY 
In the first place, scholars at institutions like Pepperdine 
commonly commit themselves both to the Christian faith 
and to the life of the mind, but often struggle to connect 
these dimensions in a meaningful way. After all, the 
academy invites openness, diversity, and critical 
scholarship, while the Christian religion demands a highly 
particularistic faith commitment. The question we must 
therefore ask is this: how is it possible to nurture one's 
comi:nitment to a highly particularistic religion like 
Christianity, and nurture at the very same time a 
commitment to values like diversity and genuine openness 
to perspectives that differ from one's own? 
The answer to that question has much to do with the 
paradox of the Christian faith. That paradox begins with 
the incarnation--the notion that an infinite God appeared in 
finite human flesh--and then goes on to manifest itself in a 
myriad of other ways. In the Christian tradition, for 
example, life always springs from death, the deepest levels 
of fulfillment always emerge from self-denial, leadership 
always grows.from servanthood, and the ability to affirm 
diversity always springs from an affirmation of Christian 
particularity. 
How might this paradoxical character of the Christian faith 
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play itself out in the context of the life of the mind? Jesus 
underscores the particularity of the Christian tradition 
when He says of Himself, "I am the way, the truth, and the 
life. No one comes to the Father but by me." 
And yet, this very same Jesus also taught, 
You have heard that it was said, "Love your neighbor and 
hate your enemy. " But I tell you: Love your enemies and 
pray for those who persecute you, that you may be sons of 
your Father in heaven. He causes his sun to rise on the 
evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the 
unrighteous. If you love those who love you, what reward 
will you get? Are not even the tax collectors doing that? 
And if you greet only your brothers, what are you doing 
more than others? Do not even pagans do that? Be 
perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect. 
(Matt. 5:43-48) 
The truth is, Jesus consistently reached out to the powerful 
and to the marginalized, to Jews and to Greeks, to men and 
to women, to slaves and to free Roman citizens, to 
prostitutes, to tax collectors, and to thieves. Today, His 
compassionate concern extends to every man and woman 
in this multicultural world in which we live: Asians and 
Africans, Hispanics and Native Americans, Buddhists and 
Hindus, Jews and Christians. When it comes to 
compassionate concern, Jesus leaves no one out. 
This means that if we ask Jesus to define for us the 
meaning of diversity, we must be prepared for an answer 
that is absolutely inclusive. In Jesus' world, all human 
beings are infinitely valuable. From the rich young ruler to 
the woman caught in adultery, Jesus took everyone He 
encountered with complete and radical seriousness. 
And so we are left with the question, Can we serve Jesus 
and celebrate diversity at one and the same time? If we 
understand anything at all about Jesus, the question 
answers itself. The truth is, we cannot serve Jesus without 
serving the diversity of peoples and cultures that abound in 
our world. 
But there is more, for on the question of diversity, 
Christian faith goes far beyond the intellectual tradition 
that sustains diversity in the modem, secular academy. 
That tradition simply holds that "All men are created equal 
and are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
rights." This is a marvelous beginning, but Christian faith 
moves beyond equality and rights to love, service, and 
compassion. 
Christians are told, for example, to love not only our 
friends but also our enemies--those whom we are inclined 
not to like, or those whose folkways or religious traditions 
may cause us considerable discomfort, or those whom the. 
rest of society tends to leave behind for whatever reason. 
Thus, Jesus tells us, 
When you give a luncheon or dinner, do not invite your 
friends, your brothers or relatives, or your rich neighbors; 
if you do, they may invite you back and so you will be 
repaid. But when you give a banquet, invite the poor, the 
crippled, the lame, [and] the blind. (Luke 14:12-13) 
Over the years this tradition of Christian compassion has 
played itself out in some important ways. For example, in 
spite of the fact that America's most notable revolutionary 
leaders affirmed the proposition that "all men are created 
equal," they failed to see how that proposition might 
demand liberation of their slaves. In contrast, the Quakers, 
driven by the biblical tradition of love and compassion for 
all human beings, had freed their slaves by the time 
America declared its independence from Great Britain. 
In our own tradition of Churches of Christ, this same 
biblical tradition inspired Barton Stone and his followers 
who lived in the vicinity of Cane Ridge, Kentucky to free 
their slaves as well. And they took this action long before 
most white people in the American South had even 
considered emancipation of slaves as an option. Thus, 
Joseph Thomas, a preacher in the Christian movement in 
the early nineteenth century, reported in 1810-11 that 
The christian companies in this settlement and about Cane 
Ridge have been large; but within a few years, many of 
them, who held black people as slaves, emancipated them, 
and have moved to the state of Ohio. I will observe that the 
christians of these parts abhor the idea of slavery, and 
some of them have almost tho 't that they who hold to 
slavery cannot be a christian. 
It is undeniably true that many Christians across the 
centuries have failed to live out the Christian mandate for 
love and compassion for all human beings. But the fact 
that so many Christians have failed in this regard in no wa 
invalidates the vision itself. The teachings of our Lord stil 
stand, whether Christians implement those teachings or n 
It must be clear by now that while the modern secu 
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academy values diversity, so does the Christian faith. And 
yet, the Christian scholar must always bear in mind that 
when we compare the Christian university with the modern 
secular academy, the grounds for the commitment to 
diversity are not the same. The secular academy prizes 
diversity because it affirms the democratic faith that "all 
men are created equal." On the other hand, Christians 
prize diversity simply because they affirm the life and 
teachings of Jesus the Christ. 
This particularity--this radical commitment to this very 
particular person called Jesus the Christ--is precisely what 
scandalizes the critics of Christian higher education. But 
the critics fail to see that Christians can affirm diversity in 
radical and far-reaching ways, not in spite of their 
commitment to the Christian particularity, but precisely 
because of that commitment. 
In spite of all this, many critics of Christian higher 
education will no doubt suggest that our argument thus far 
has really begged the fimdamental question. It is one thing 
to extend service and compassion to a diversity of human 
beings. It is· quite another thing to take seriously their 
ideas, their cultural traditions, even their religious 
perspectives. This, the critics argue, is the crucial step that 
many Christian colleges and universities are unwilling to 
take. 
The critics may be correct in their observation regarding 
some Christian institutions of higher learning. But they are 
wrong if they think that Christian scholars have no biblical 
mandate for taking seriously the ideas-:-even the religious 
traditions--of the wide variety of people who inhabit this 
globe. 
The plain truth is that Christians are called to take other 
human beings seriously. In the context of the academy, 
this means that we must listen carefully to their points of 
view, always asking what we might learn from those who 
come from cultural, political, and religious traditions that 
are different from our own. Listening does not necessarily 
mean agreement. But listen we must. As Christian 
scholars, we can do no less. 
. ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
I want now to ask about a second value the academy holds 
dear, the notion of academic freedom. 
Critics sometimes argue that Christian institutions of 
higher learning can't extend academic freedom in truly 
meaningful ways because of their highly particularistic 
religious commitments. I grant you, there are many 
Christian colleges and universities that refuse to embrace 
genuine academic freedom for their faculties. But 
institutions like these simply don't reflect the genius of the 
Christian faith. 
I want to suggest that there are no institutions anywhere in 
the world better prepared to extend academic freedom than 
Christian institutions of higher learning. I say this because 
of the nature of the Christian·gospel. Let me explain. 
The Christian gospel begins with the affirmation that no 
human being is God. To the contrary, every human being 
is finite, fimdamentally flawed, and inescapably sinful. No 
one, therefore, can possibly perform enough good works or 
muster up enough righteousness to earn a seat in the 
kingdom of God. Instead, justification or forgiveness 
comes to us only through the grace of God which we 
receive through faith and not by works. As Paul wrote in 
Galatians 2:15-16, 
We who are Jews by birth and not "Gentile sinners" know 
that a man is not justified by observing the law, but by faith 
in Jesus Christ. So we, too, have put our faith in Christ 
Jesus that we may be justified by faith in Christ and not by 
observing the law, because by observing the law no· one 
will be justified. 
This is the core of the-gospel of Jesus Christ. 
Martin Luther often used a Latin phrase to capture the 
genius of the Christian gospel: "simul Justus et peccator" 
or, in English, "simultaneously justified and a sinner." I 
can perhaps best explain the. meaning of that phrase by 
contrasting Luther's vision with· my own childhood 
misunderstandings. 
When I was in the fifth grade, growing up in San Angelo, 
Texas, I always walked to school and had to cross a very 
busy street before I reached my final destination. I vividly 
recall reminding myself on many occasions that if per 
chance I were struck by a car and killed on the way to 
· school, I must remember'to pray God's forgiveness for all
the sins I had committed since my most recent prayers. If
I managed to get that petition in before I expired, I had a
chance at going to heaven. If not, I knew I would be
doomed to eternal damnation.
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Many years later, in a class on the book of Romans at 
Harding College, I learned that the gospel of Jesus Christ 
completely undermined those childish misunderstandings. 
My epiphany came when the professor unpacked Paul's 
assertion in Romans 8: 1: "There is therefore now no [italics 
mine] condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus." No 
condemnation. What a magnificent concept! This passage 
means that my salvation does not depend on the frequency 
of my prayers or the quality of my works, but solely and 
entirely on the grace of a loving God. 
And yet, the fact that we are not condemned does not mean 
that we are no longer sinners. This is the crucial point that 
we must grasp and the point that Luther sought to make 
when he used the phrase, "simul Justus et peccator" or, 
"simultaneously justified and a sinner." As a Christian, I 
am perpetually redeemed. But as a human being, I never 
cease to be a sinner. Simul Justus et peccator! 
Luther found this doctrine enormously liberating because 
it freed him to take seriously his finitude, his frailties, and 
his inescapably sinful nature. He never took the gospel as 
a license to sin. But the gospel did mean that he no longer 
had to pretend to be a saint. For that reason, he sometimes 
advised his followers to "sin boldly." 
The implications this notion holds for the life of the mind-­
and for academic freedom in the context of a Christian 
university--are staggering. While our finitude means that 
the Christian scholar may well misunderstand, 
miscalculate, or draw erroneous conclusions, the Christian 
paradox, simul Justus et peccator, means that the Christian 
scholar is freed to do all these things. 
Don't misunderstand. The Christian gospel is not a license 
for sloppy scholarship. But it does free us to take our 
finitude seriously, to recognize up front that we will make 
mistakes and that, indeed, we may well be wrong. This 
recognition enables the Christian scholar to approach his or 
her work with humility, to confess mistakes quickly and 
forthrightly, and to pursue the search for truth with zeal and 
· determination, knowing that complete and final truth lies
always beyond our grasp.
Or again, the depth of our humanity has determined that no 
human being--not even a Christian scholar--can finally 
escape the most radical doubts and the most radical kinds 
of questions. But the Christian paradox--simul Justus et 
peccator--means that the Christian scholar is freed to 
confront those questions honestly. No longer must we 
repress those doubts or pretend that we have perfect faith 
and perfect tranquility. Instead, we are freed to confess 
with the father of the boy with the evil spirit in Mark 9, 
"Lord I believe; help thou mine unbelief." 
Put another way, the Christian gospel enables us to be real. 
I cannot imagine a stronger foundation for responsible 
academic freedom than this. 
Finally, we must be clear on one more crucial point. In the 
previous section, we saw that for the Christian, an 
affirmation of diversity finally rests on the foundation of 
Christian particularity. So it is with academic freedom. 
The Christian scholar claims academic freedom precisely 
because that scholar takes seriously the particularity of 
Jesus the Christ. Here we encounter once again that 
amazing paradox that is so central to the Christian faith. 
We are freed to question because we affirm, and we are 
freed to doubt because we believe. Those who fail to 
discern the paradox of the Christian gospel will never 
understand how Christian faith can sustain academic 
freedom and the life of the mind. But those who have eyes 
to see will find in the Christian gospel an incredibly 
powerful support for the kinds of radical questions which 
every serious scholar must raise. 
I hope by now that the kinds of questions the Pepperdine 
Center for Faith and Leaming hopes to foster are apparent. 
Chief among those questions are these: How can Christian 
faith sustain a commitment to diversity? And how can 
Christian faith enhance the quality of academic freedom? 
ON TAKING SERIOUSLY OUR RELATIONSHIP TO 
THE, CHURCHES OF CHRIST 
But there is one more question that is vital to the work of 
Pepperdine, and it is this: how can we put to productive and 
meaningful use the relationship this University sustains to 
the Churches of Christ? 
We commonly say that apart from our relationship with the 
Churches of Christ, Pepperdine would cease to be a 
Christian university altogether. And that is very likely 
true, for the Church of Christ is our mooring, our anchor, 
our very tangible connection to the world of Christian 
tradition and Christian faith. 
But is this the only rationale we can offer for maintaining 
our relation with Churches of Christ? If so, then we have 
sold this tradition very short indeed. 
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The far more pressing questions are these. How can the 
heritage of Churches of Christ sustain us in the work of 
higher education? Are there resources in the heritage of 
Churches of Christ to which we can appeal as we seek to 
enhance diversity and academic freedom? Or again, how 
can the heritage of Churches of Christ help sustain the life 
of the mind? 
These are questions we must address. For if we ignore 
these questions, the day may come when faculty at this 
institution will judge our relationship with Churches of 
Christ as irrelevant at best and, at worst, as a hindrance to 
the life of the mind and the work of higher education. If 
the faculty eventually make that judgment, then we can rest 
assured that Pepperdine's relationship with Churches of 
Christ will have become an empty formality, lacking both 
substance and content. 
So what might we say about this tradition? Does it possess 
resources that can sustain us in the work of scholarship, 
teaching, and learning? The answer to that question must 
be a resounding "yes." 
Before I proceed . with this line of thought, I want to 
acknowledge up front that I am not naive about the history 
of this tradition. I am painfully aware that there is much in 
the history of Churches of Christ that works against 
diversity, that undermines freedom of thought and freedom 
of expression, and that offers little support for the life of 
the mind. 
But having said that, we must also confess that there is 
much in this tradition to which we can appeal on behalf of 
the work in which we are engaged. 
First, Churches of Christ emerged in the early nineteenth 
century as a unity movement. The founders of this 
tradition--Alexander Campbell and Barton W. Stone-­
lamented the fact that so many Christian churches on the 
American frontier viewed other denominations with such 
hostility. Campbell and Stone, therefore, gave birth to a 
movement that aimed for unity in diversity. Stone, for 
example, admonished his followers in 1830, 
Be careful not to wound the feelings of the least christian 
of any name. View all the children of God as your 
brethren, whatever name they may bear. What if they have 
received wrong opinions of truth? This is no reason why 
you should despise or reject them. 
This is a powerful model for an institution like Pepperdine 
that seeks to enhance a diversity of peoples and 
perspectives. 
Second, Churches of Christ emerged in the early nineteenth 
century as a freedom movement. If they had any hope of 
uniting Christians while respecting a diversity of 
perspectives, then Campbell and Stone knew they had to 
grant to all men and women the freedom and the right to 
search for truth for themselves. This was no mere strategy, 
but a conviction that grew from their awareness of their . 
own sinfulness and their own limitations. Stone therefore 
wrote in 1829, 
I have too much evidence of my liability to err to make my 
present opinions a test by which to judge the hearts of my 
fellow Christians. 
Further, Stone and Campbell knew how easy it is for 
religious people--indeed, for any people--to succumb to 
traditions that stifle the mind and cut off fresh and creative 
thinking. Accordingly, Campbell wrote, 
I have endeavored to read the scriptures as though no one 
had read them before me; and I am as much on my guard 
against reading them to-day, through the medium of my 
own views yesterday, or a week ago, as I am against being 
influenced by any foreign name, authority, or system, 
whatever. 
But perhaps the strongest statement one can find in the 
annals of Churches of Christ on behalf of intellectual and 
spiritual freedom is a statement from John Rogers, the 
preacher for the Church of Christ in Carlisle, Kentucky in 
the early nineteenth century. In 1830, Rogers penned these 
simple but powerful words. 
The fatal e"or of all reformers has been that they have too 
hastily concluded that they knew the whole truth, and 
have settled back upon the same principles of 
proscription, intolerance and persecution, against which 
they so strongly remonstrated. . . . Having, then, fall in 
our view, this fatal rock, on which so many reformers have 
split, may we studiously avoid it. We have no reason to 
conclude, we know all the truth .... We have nothing to 
lose in this inquiry after truth. We have no system to bind 
us to human opinions. 
These are not isolated statements that reflect a minority 
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voice in Churches of Christ in the founding years, but 
statements that have reflected the genius of this tradition 
for two full centuries. And it is precisely this genius--this 
"heart of the tradition" --that allows us to build a truly great 
university on the foundation offered to us by the heritage 
of the Churches of Christ. 
If we hope that the heritage of Churches of Christ can 
really provide a foundation for the life of the mind, then we 
must make certain that all the people who work and study 
at this institution have some familiarity with the meaning 
of this tradition. This is why the Center for Faith and 
Learning devotes a segment of each and every seminar to 
helping faculty, staff, students, and administration to 
understand more fully how the heritage of Churches of 
Christ can, indeed, help sustain the life of the mind. 
CONCLUSIONS 
So now, we return to the question with which we began. 
What does it mean when we affirm Pepperdine's mission 
statement that plainly asserts that "Pepperdine is a 
Christian university"? 
It means, first of all, that Pepperdine as an institution takes 
its stand on the Christian faith. But second, it means that 
precisely because of its commitment to the Christian faith, .·. 
Pepperdine seeks to enhance diversity, maintain academic 
freedom, and nurture the life of the mind. And finally, it 
means that Pepperdine seeks to strengthen its relationship 
with Churches of Christ, not only because we know that 
apart from that relationship, the Christian character of this 
institution would likely collapse, but also because we know 
that the Churches of Christ can provide us with invaluable 
supports for the work in which we are engaged. 
We therefore press ahead in our attempt to make of 
Pepperdine University a truly great center of teaching, 
learning and scholarship. We are confident that we will 
succeed in this task, not in spite of our commitment to the 
Christian faith, but because of that commitment. This is 
why we confess in our mission statement that "Pepperdine 
is a Christian university committed to the highest standards 
of academic excellence and Christian values." When we 
make that confession, we affirm once again the paradox of 
the Christian faith that we are freed to question because we 
affirm, and we are freed to doubt because we believe. 
Richard Hughes is a professor of Religion and the director of the Pepperdine Center for Faith and Learning. 
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IVORY TOWER OR HOLY MOUNTAIN? FAITH AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
Reprinted with permission from the January/February 2001 issue of Academe 
Nicholas Wolterstorff 
Is it wrong for a college or university to attach religious 
qualifications to the academic freedom of its faculty? 
Before I answer that question, let me explain what I take 
academic freedom to be. Perhaps it's easiest to see what it 
is by considering what constitutes an infringement on it. 
Infringing on a professor's academic freedom consists of 
impairing, or threatening to impair, her academic position 
or standing in some way or the other: firing her or 
threatening to fire her, refusing to promote her or 
threatening to refuse to promote her, preventing her from 
serving on important committees or threatening to prevent 
her from so serving, rejecting her candidacy for some post 
or threatening to reject it, and so forth. 
But of course many such impairments or threats do not 
constitute infringements on academic freedom. What has 
to be added is something about the grounds for the actual 
or threatened impairment. Infringement of academic 
freedom typically happens when the actual or threatened 
impairment occurs on account of the person's position on 
some issue, or on account of her publicizing her position. 
This issue may or may not be within the person's academic 
field; it's all too usual for the threat to be issued on account 
of the person's position on some religious or political issue. 
The fact that te academy has to make judgements of 
competence requires that we say more than just that, 
however. For an infringement of academic freedom to 
occur, the impairment of a person's academic standing has 
to based on some other aspect of the positions he holds 
rather than their scholarly competence or incompetence. It 
has to be based on what I shall call the ideological content 
of his position. If the university refuses to promote some 
young professor because of the scholarly incompetence of 
the positions he holds, although it would be impairing his 
academic standing on account of certain of his positions, 
such impairment would not constitute infringement on the 
person's academic freedom. 
The distinction between disapproving of the ideological 
content of what a person says and judging it incompetent 
is, of course, fraught with difficulty in application. Not 
that the distinction can never be confidently drawn; 
certainly it can be. Nonetheless, those who talk as if the 
several academic guilds--the guild of historians, the guild 
of philosophers, and so on--have arrived at ideologically 
neutral criteria of competence, and if it's easy to 
distinguish the employment of these from ideological 
discrimination, seem to me to be living in a fantasyland. 
Let me now join together the two components of what it is 
to infringe on a person's academic freedom to which I have 
called attention: to infringe on a person's academic 
freedom is to impair or threaten to impair that person's 
position or standing in the academy on account of the 
ideological content of the position she holds or publicizes 
on some issue. 
QUALIFIED FREEDOM 
In practice, the right to academic freedom is no more 
absolute than the civil liberty of free speech. The 
formulation concerning free speech in the U.S. Bill of 
Rights is absolute, but if one looks at a law that emerges 
from judicial decisions having to do with free speech, it's 
clear that the free speech is a qualified liberty. Judges 
address the facts of the cases before them, and the law 
emerges from their decisions. 
The same sort of thing is true for academic freedom; it is 
no more absolute than is the civil liberty of free speech. 
The guideline for the practice of the academy is not the 
stark formulation I offered above, but that formulation as 
duly qualified. 
When a court declares that it is acceptable for the 
government to impose some restriction on a person's 
speech, is the court saying it's acceptable for the 
government to infringe on free speech? That falls strange 
on the ear; the connotation on infringe suggests that 
infringing on someone's right is a bad thing to do. Better 
to say that the court's decisions function to qualify a 
freedom. I shall speak of academic freedom in the same 
way. Although it's never a good thing to infringe on 
academic freedom, every educational institution does and 
should attach qualifications to that freedom. The issue will 
always be which qualifications are appropriate. 
EIGHT CONSIDERATIONS 
In considering academic freedom in religiously based 
institutions, I can think of eight considerations that seem 
Intersections/Spring 200 I 
-10-
necessary or useful to bear in mind. Some of these 
considerations relate to the social setting in which we deal 
with the issue of academic freedom; others are matters of 
semiphilosophical background. 
Modern Society 
In the first place, questions of academic freedom arise for 
us within the context of a modernized society that 
recognizes distinct spheres of social and cultural life. 
Some of my readers will understand that I am alluding to 
Max Weber's theory of modernization; because I cannot 
assume that all are familiar with the theory, let me say just 
a word about it. 
Weber saw the essence of modernization in the emergence 
of differentiated spheres of activity--specifically, the social 
spheres of the economy, state, and household, and the 
cultural spheres of academic learning (Wissenschaft), art, 
law, and ethics. Weber claimed that the dynamic of 
rationalization, after disenchanting the world and confining 
the ethic of brotherliness to the realm of the private, 
brought these spheres to the light of day by differentiating 
them from each other and securing the relative 
independence of action within them from outside influence. 
Whether or not Weber was right to claim that 
rationalization accounts for the differentiation of spheres is 
not relevant to the subject matters at hand. What is 
relevant, however, is the basic claim that modernized 
societies--of which ours is certainly one--are characterized 
by such differentiation. For it is only in such societies that 
the issue of academic freedom, in anything like the form it 
takes for us, can arise. 
Weber's assertion that, spurred on by rationalization, life 
within the differentiated spheres follows its own inherent 
laws unless distorted by outside influence is something I 
will return to later. 
Religious Pluralism and Democracy 
Second, the issue of academic freedom arises for us not 
only within a modernized society, but also within a 
religiously pluralistic one within a liberal democratic 
polity. The liberal democratic from of polity emerged in 
the West as a solution to the problem of social order posed 
when the citizens of a single state embraced a diversity of 
incompatible comprehensive perspectives on God and the 
good--some of these perspectives being religious, some 
not. A liberal polity accords to its citizens such ci 
liberties as freedom of conscience, freedom to exerci 
one's religion, freedom of speech, and freedom 
assembly. And it refrains from indoctrinating its citize 
into any comprehensive religious or philosophic 
perspective; it treats impartially all the comprehensi 
perspectives to be found in the society. 
Civil Society 
Third, the issue of academic freedom arises for us within 
a society that exhibits extraordinary scope and vitality in its 
civil dimension. Totalitarian regimes, so as to curb all 
disruptive impulses,· push civil society to the margins by 
massively expanding the scope of the state: business, 
banking, manufacturing, and farming all become state­
owned; educators become state· functionaries, as do clergy 
in extreme cases; and so forth. American civil society is 
subject to a good deal of government regulation--giving 
ground for much grumbling by those on the political right. 
But it is extraordinary how many of our institutions and 
organizations do not in any way belong to the government, 
and extraordinary how few of us are government 
employees. Equally striking is the vitality of our civil 
society--a ferment of new initiatives and new organizations 
of every imaginable sort. 
Education 
Fourth, the issue of academic freedom arises for us within 
the context of an educational system that, as a whole, is 
radically decentralized, full of voluntary organizations and 
activity, and highly competitive. 
Religion 
Fifth, it's important to recognize that the religion of many 
people in American society is what can best can be called 
"holistic." No doubt for some people, religion is no more 
than a sector of their lives--perhaps a very important sector, 
but a sector nevertheless, having little to do with the rest of 
their lives: little to do with their politics, their economic 
activity, their recreation, or their moral code. But there are 
many other people for whom religion is anything but a • 
sector; it decisively shapes their political and economic 
activity, how they rear their families, what they believe 
about the origins of life, about medicine, about the 
dynamics of the self, about the nature of justice and the 
benefits of freedom, and so forth. 
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The Academy 
Sixth, over the past twenty-five years or so there has been 
an upheaval in the regnant understanding of the academic 
enterprise. Perhaps the deepest component of the self­
understanding that dominated the academy before the 
upheaval was the conviction that well-formed learning is 
a generically human enterprise. To put the point 
pictorially: before entering the halls of learning, we were 
to render inoperative all our particularities--of gender, race, 
nationality, religion, social class, age, and so on--to allow 
only what belonged to our generic humanity to be operative 
within those halls. 
A second component in the once-dominant self­
understanding of the academy was a distinctive hierarchy 
among the academic disciplines. At the top were the 
physical science and mathematics; these were the 
paradigmatic disciplines. At the bottom were the 
humanities. The social science occupied an unsteady 
positions somewhere in between. Theology? If one 
thought of theology at all, the place one assigned it 
. depended on whether one judged it to be rationally 
grounded or not. If it was, it belonged somewhere among 
the humanities. If it wasn't, it was off the ladder at the 
bottom. 
Behind this hierarchy was a certain understanding of what 
constitutes the "logic" or methodology of well formed 
Wissenschaft. The thought was that mathematics and the 
natural sciences sat at the top of the hierarchy because they 
already exhibited the methodology of well-formed 
Wissenschaft. But that methodology was not unique in 
principle to them, it was the logic that any academic 
discipline would exhibit once it attained the status of a 
well-formed Wissenschaft. As to what the logic of a well­
formed Wissenschaft was, on that there was somewhat less 
consensus than on the other matters I have mentioned. 
Nonetheless, the dominant view was that the method of 
well-formed Wissenschaft was foundationalist--more 
specifically, classically foundationalist. 
Although this once-dominant self-understanding of the 
. modern Western academy has not disappeared, it has 
certainly been shaken, so much so that it is no longer the 
dominant understanding. I look on what happened as a 
"first revolution" and a "second revolution." First to go to 
. was the conviction that the logic of well-formed 
Wissenschaft is classical foundationalism. The emergence 
of metaepistemology, among philosophers, played a 
significant role in this development; when philosophers 
moved to the metalevel, they quickly recognized that 
classical foundationalism is but one of many options for 
structuring well-formed Wissenschaft, and not the most 
plausible. 
More decisive, however, was a quite different 
development. Around thirty years ago, a group of scholars 
trained as natural scientists, philosophers, and historians, 
began to study the episodes from the history of modem 
Western natural science to compare the dominant self­
understanding of natural science with actual practice. 
Thomas Kuhn became the most famous of these scholars. 
What they bumped up against over and over were . 
reputable, even admirable, episodes that simply did not fit 
the self-understanding of natural science as a classically 
foundationalist enterprise. One outcome of these 
discoveries was the breakup of the old hierarchy of the 
disciplines, which had been based on judgements about the 
degree to which a discipline exhibited the logic of well­
formed Wissenschaft. Now there was no longer consensus 
whether there was even such a thing as the logic, let alone 
on what it might be. 
That was the first revolution. The second revolution 
involved the repudiation of the conviction that well-formed 
academic learning is a product of our generic humanity. 
Historically, the academy in the modem West has been 
populated mostly by white European bourgeois males. 
Slowly, as a result of various liberation movements in 
society, its makeup has evolved, so that now significant 
numbers of the once-disenfranchised enjoy positions within 
the academy. Some twenty-five years ago, their numbers 
reached a critical mass, and they were emboldened to say 
what they had long felt if not thought, or thought if not 
said
., 
namely, that it is sheer pretense to present the learning 
of the academy as generically human in character. 
The learning of the academy is unavoidably particularist; 
it is best to acknowledge that, shed one's allusions, and act 
accordingly. The pluralization if the academy is not a 
matter of happenstance but of essence. Of course, there are 
degrees: literature, history, and philosophy are further from 
being generically human than are mathematics and natural 
science. 
Ideas 
A seventh thing to keep in mind when considering the 
question of academic freedom is that ideas matter to 
people. Different ideas matter to different people, but for 
everyone there are some ideas that matter. We all invest 
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ourselves in the world, and part of our investment is in the 
fate of certain ideas. Their fate, or their apparent fate, stirs 
up emotions in us. We get angry, discouraged, or disturbed 
when the ideas we treasure seem threatened; we feel 
jubilant when they appear to flourish. 
All of this is obvious: people care about ideas. I mention 
it only because I find it endemic among academics to act as 
if it is not true. More precisely, academics want members 
of the public to feel jubilation over their thoughts, but they 
don't want members of the public to feel anger over them. 
Academics want to be allowed to say and write whatever 
they wish with only positive consequences. Of academics 
alone should courage never be required. 
My response is: let's grow up! Stop being adolescent. 
People do care about ideas. We had better expect that 
people will sometimes get angry with what we say. 
Personhood 
Eight, and last, it is profoundly important for society to 
allow its scholars the duly qualified freedom to work out 
their thoughts as they see fit. How enormously 
impoverished, in multiple ways, humanity would be if no 
such freedom existed. How impoverished are those 
societies in which such freedom is absent. 
A reason of quite a different sort seems to me even more 
important. The abridgement of academic freedom 
constitutes a profound violation of the person, and in this 
world of ours, nothing is of greater worth than persons; 
correspondingly, no greater evil exists than the violations 
of persons. The violation of a person is the desecration of 
one of the images of God. The loss of that person's 
contribution may mean that the flourishing of humanity is 
somewhat diminished; much worse is the fact that an icon 
of the Holy One has been desecrated. 
DIVERSITY OF LEARNING 
Religiously affiliated colleges and universities all belong 
to the private sector of American society--to what I earlier 
called "civil society" --and the are multitudinous. The total 
number of students enrolled in such institutions is 
considerably less than the combined enrollment in state 
institutions and private secular institutions; nonetheless, 
there are hundreds of religiously based (and affiliated) 
institutions of higher education in this country. Their 
existence in such numbers is a prime manifestation of the 
extraordinary vitality of American civil society. In no 
other country in the world is there anything like it. 
This striking vitality and variety in the private educational 
sector, together with the fact that we live in a liberal 
democratic society (in which the state must refrain from 
inducting its citizens into any comprehensive perspective 
on God and the good), means that there is nothing an 
academic is free to teach in the public educational sector 
that she is not free to teach somewhere in the private 
educational sector. But the converse is not true: there are 
many things an academic in this country is free to teach 
somewhere in the private educational sector that she is not 
free to teach in the public sector. 
There is, in this respect, a great deal more academic 
freedom in the private sector of the American educational 
system than there is in the public sector. In discussions on 
academic freedom, this point is seldom made; yet it is 
indisputably true. In the private sector, one can explore 
and espouse religiously grounded lines of thought that one 
would not be able to explore or espouse in the public 
sector. The memory is fresh in my mind of a recent case at 
my own university, which, though not public, nonetheless 
sees itself as secular. A candidate for a post in religious 
studies was rejected because, some said, her lecture was 
too "confessional." 
It would be a tragedy of massive proportions if the 
extraordinary scope of academic freedom in the private 
sector of American education were in any way infringed 
on--if it were abridged or restricted. People like the 
candidate I just mentioned would be left without a teaching 
post unless they "shaped up." Some writers tend to think 
through the contours of duly qualified academic freedom 
for state. institutions and for secular private colleges, and 
they argue, or just assume, that those same contours ought 
to hold for all educational institutions. But imposing these 
contours would not only violate the personhood of many 
who teach in these private institutions, who believe with all 
their heart that they are called to live out their religious 
convictions in the academy instead of confining them to the 
familial and the ecclesiastical sectors; it would also 
impoverish our society by seriously diminishing the rich 
diversity of learning that the American educational system 
now produces. 
But if it is indisputably true that the private sector of 
American education, including religiously based 
institutions, offers freedom to a much wider variety of 
academic than does the public sector, why is it so 
commonly thought that religiously based institutions 
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uniquely threaten academic freedom? 
The answer to that question is pretty clear. I do think that 
it is important to compare, as I just did, the entire private 
sector of American higher education with the entire public 
sector on the matter of academic freedom. But one has to 
supplement that comparison of total sectors with talk about 
particular institutions; it is, after all, not sectors but 
institutions that hire professors, instruct students, and are 
governed by administrators. 
BOUNDARIES TO FREEDOM 
At most religiously based colleges and universities, a 
professor's standing in the institution depends in some way 
or other on the ideological content of what he or she says 
or publicizes on certain issues. And to a good many 
writers on the subject, that fact, all by itself, constitutes an 
unacceptable infringement of academic freedom. It will 
appear that way especially if one focuses on just one aspect 
of what goes on at state universities, neglecting the rest-� 
that is, if one focuses on the lack of official religious 
requirements for faculty at state institutions but fails to 
note that those some state universities have severe 
restrictions on what a professor may and may not teach 
with respect to religion. 
Earlier I made the point that just as legally qualified free 
speech governs our lives as citizens, rather than the 
unqualified affirmation of free speech that the U.S. Bill of 
Rights speaks of, so also it is duly qualified academic 
freedom that we have to deal with in our educational 
institutions. So the question is not whether it is acceptable 
for religiously based colleges and universities to attach 
qualifications to academic freedom. All educational 
institutions attach qualifications to academic freedom; none 
allows professors to teach whatever they wish. The 
question is whether attaching religious qualifications to 
academic freedom is inherently appropriate and, if it is not 
inherently appropriate, whether the form of such 
qualifications sometimes take makes them inappropriate. 
Ever since the founding of Harvard College, groups of 
people with shared religious convictions have joined 
together to found colleges that reflect their religion: a 
faculty gets assembled, students are enrolled, and a 
constituency is developed. The religion in 
question is almost always to some extent holistic; those 
who confine their religion to the distinct sectors of the 
familial and the ecclesiastical are much less inclined to 
found colleges than those who do not so confine their 
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religion. Colleges in the private sector also get formed for 
other than religious reasons: St. John's College, for 
example, was formed out of a secular vision of education 
as grounded in the Great Books. But far and away the most 
common foundations have been religious foundations. 
Almost invariably, when such a college gets founded, 
religious qualifications are attached to the academic 
freedom of the faculty. I see no reason for supposing that 
such qualifications are inherently wrong. I daresay we all 
agree that it is perfectly fine, in the context of American 
society, for a group of people to get together to form a 
Great Books college--even though such a college will not 
welcome those who think that an educational program 
based on the Great Books is a pack of nonsense. So why 
would it be wrong for a group of people to get together to 
form a college on one or another form of religion--even 
though such a college will not welcome those who think 
that species of religion is a pack of nonsense? Might the 
though be the Weberian idea that Wissenschaft must now 
follow its own internal dynamics, so that any influence 
from the side of religion is now intellectually 
irresponsible? This point might have had some plausibility 
before that upheaval in our understanding of learning 
occurred, but after the upheaval, it seems to me to have no 
plausibility whatsoever. 
I have argued for as double negative: it is not inherently 
inappropriate for a college or university to attach religious 
qualifications to the academic freedom of its faculty. Just 
as important, if not more so, so is this positive point: it 
would be a violation of the very idea of a liberal 
democratic society if a movement arose to prevent or 
restrict the formation of religiously based colleges and 
universities. To prevent or restrict their formation would 
violate freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and 
freedom of assembly. It is characteristic of totalitarian 
regimes to try and prevent private initiatives in education. 
But though religious qualifications on academic freedom 
are not inherently unacceptable in the American system, 
what must at once be added is that when we get down to 
the details--as we must--we find that religiously based 
colleges and universities do often illicitly infringe on 
academic freedom. No doubt about it. Whether they more 
often infringe on academic freedom that do state or secular 
private institutions, I do not know. 
Those who have taught at secular institutions would have 
to have their heads in the sand not to be aware of the extent 
to which ideological considerations, as distinct from 
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considerations of competence, enter in hiring, promoting, 
and firing. But be that as it may: duly qualified academic 
freedom is often egregiously infringed on in religiously 
based institutions. The infringements occur when the 
religious qualifications are applied unjustly: for example, 
when they are never fully stated, or not stated clearly at the 
time of appointment; when their application is arbitrary or 
irregular; or when their is no recourse available to the 
victim. 
Over the years, I have acquired a broad acquaintance with 
the religiously based colleges and universities of America. 
I have learned that the history of these institutions is 
littered with stories of unjust, often grossly unjust, 
infringements on academic freedom. The stories constitute 
a shameful blotch on the reputation of these colleges and 
universities and put into question the sincerity of those who 
profess high religious ideals for them. I defend the right of 
these colleges and universities to attach religious 
qualifications to academic freedom within their 
institutions. But I must, and will, add that all too often, 
they violate the personhood of their faculty members in the 
way they apply the qualifications. Often, the person 
violated is a brother or sister in the faith of those who 
perpetuate the violation. 
My own view, then, is that the best service the AAUP can 
continue to render to this teeming multitude of American 
institutions of higher education is to compose and 
recommend model codes of procedure for resolving issues 
of academic freedom. Almost always, it is in the 
procedure, not in the qualifications as such, that the 
injustice lies. Where there is no rule of law but only the 
command of persons, where secrecy and arbitrariness 
reign, where one never knows when and why the ax will 
fall, there justice weeps. 
Nicholas Wolterstorff is Noah Porter professor of Philosophical Theology at Yale University. 
UNEASY PARTNERS? RELIGION AND ACADEMICS 
Reprinted with permission from the January/February 2001 issue of Academe 
Storm Bailey 
As a group, religiously affiliated colleges are much like 
those with no religious connections. Some have a lot of 
money, but most get by on less. Some have wide name 
recognition; others enjoy a regional reputation or none at 
all. Some have sensitive and competent administrators 
who are on good terms with faculty, and some fall short of 
that blessed state. Some maintain high standards of 
academic excellence, but others achieve more modest (if 
not to say mediocre) levels of academic quality. 
Religiously affiliated institutions resemble their secular 
counterparts in these and other ways because they are 
subject to the same forces and circumstances that affect all 
of higher education. At the same time, however, the 
religious identity of these colleges has the potential to set 
them apart by making a distinct contribution to their 
character and quality. In the area of community life, for 
example institutional aspirations and policies are often 
explicitly linked to religious commitment or identity. 
My own college is one of twenty-eight institutions 
affiliated with the Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
America. These colleges see lives of service, the 
integration of values and practice, and the ideals of 
character and community as essential to their identity. 
Insofar as people on campus--in or outside the religious 
tradition--value such goals, pursuing them and achieving 
them will be perceived as adding to the college's quality. 
It is .not so surprising when the religious identity of a 
college or university is taken to contribute to its 
community life, but observers of higher education seem 
less likely to view religious commitment as integral to 
academic goals. Many·people see religion and academics 
as uneasy partners, if not completely at odds. This 
inclination shows itself when we think or speak of schools 
as being pretty good academically in spite of their church 
or religious affiliation. It is only fair to note that we have 
a good deal of evidence--historical and contemporary--to 
justify such reactions. But the question is whether such a 
state of affairs must be. Are there ways in which the 
religious commitments of colleges and universities can and 
do serve their academic aspirations? 
The answer to this question is yes on several grounds. 
Take, for example, the conception of service already 
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mentioned in the context of campus life. Many church­
related colleges were founded as mission institutions--not 
in a narrowly evangelical sense, but in that of service to 
individuals and society. Service is central to the academic 
purpose of these schools. In Models of Christian Higher 
Education, Pepperdine professor of religion Richard 
Hughes identifies the ongoing theological commitment to 
service as a chief contribution to the life of the mind in 
historically Mennonite colleges--which are but one group 
of colleges among many to have such a commitment. 
Service is learning in practice, and although neither the 
practice nor the pedagogy of applied learning is exclusive 
to church-related educational communities, the religious 
commitments of such institutions straightforwardly affect 
their academic quality through their emphasis on service. 
I use the phrase "educational communities" advisedly, 
because it is plain that higher education is a communal 
activity. Even those who are inclined to view Plato's 
allegory of the cave--a tale of individual enlightenment--as 
the paradigm of true learning cannot ignore the fact that the 
story, like all of Plato's ideas, is offered in dialogue form. 
Teaching and learning take place in networks of committed 
relationships. (Plato's own academy was a religious 
community of sorts that endured for nearly a millennium.) 
Religion is certainly not the only basis for community, but 
just as certainly, it is a common one. Is religious 
commitment, particularly in what has been called the 
Hebrew-Christian tradition, as fruitful a foundation for 
academic communities as other shared commitments? 
Education theorist Parker Palmer and Mark Schwehn, dean 
of Christ College at Valparaiso University, to name just 
two, believe that it is. 
In Exiles from Eden, Schwehn emphasizes the role of 
community in knowing and, therefore, in learning. The 
intellectual life, he suggests, is inseparable from the moral 
life, and the Christian tradition, among others, nourishes 
both. The pursuit of truth, writes Schwehn, is linked 
inextricably to care taken with the lives and the thoughts of 
others. Thus, he argues, the academic life requires such 
spiritual values as humility, self-sacrifice, and charity. 
Whole-hearted acceptance of Schwehn's communitarian 
epistemology is not necessary for the purposes of the 
present argument. To whatever extent readers recognize 
the role and importance of community in higher learning, 
religious commitment can be seen to support that learning. 
INTEGRATION OF KNOWLEDGE 
At the institutional level, religious identity serves academic 
goals by providing a framework for integrating disciplinary 
pursuits and perspectives. We may be lucky enough to 
escape the extreme ideological and administrative strife 
leading to what English professors Cary Nelson and 
Stephen Watt, in Academic Keywords: A Devil's 
Dictionary for Higher Education, call entrepreneurial 
disciplinarity, which despairs of identifying any common 
institutional mission, even within disciplines. But tension 
between disciplinary specialization and integrated 
understanding is a perennial academic problem, one that is 
increasingly acute in undergraduate liberal arts colleges but 
my no means restricted to such institutions. 
Religiously affiliated colleges and universities have, it 
seems, a great advantage in addressing this problem. 
Insofar as the core claims of the affiliated religious 
tradition cut across disciplinary lines, and insofar as those 
claims are taken seriously, they provide a set of questions 
that can help to integrate the various elements of a course 
of study. (These core claims or questions serve this 
academic function for all members of the college 
community--whether they are in the affiliated religious 
tradition or not.) 
Of course, if the religious commitment of the institution 
amounts to no more than lip service, or if the core 
questions are seen as b�ing imposed on some by others or 
widely held to be irrelevant to serious scholarly inquiry, 
then this particular benefit is unlikely to result. It follows 
that the more substantive the religious commitment, the 
greater the academic benefit. Substantive religious 
commitment in an institutions means, in part, having a 
faculty and administration that take the core questions of 
the tradition seriously. Respect for these questions and 
attention to them does not imply an imposed consensus 
about their answers. In fact, having the broadest possible 
range of perspectives on the common questions would 
seem to facilitate the. integration of a course of study. And 
such integration is a hallmark of educational quality. 
ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE 
If religiously affiliated universities are the natural habitats 
for applied learning, paradigm learning communities, and 
bastions against the malaise of fragmentation and 
disciplinary disintegration, why do we find ourselves so 
suspicious of their academic potential? What explains our 
propensity to say, "They are pretty good in spite of the 
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religion"? 
I acknowledged one answer earlier: religiously committed 
institutions and individuals do not have an exemplary track 
record. Readers of these pages are as likely as anyone to 
be aware of offenses against academic excellence in the 
name of religious commitment. The offenses most often 
take the form of undermining a key principle of such 
excellence: autonomous inquiry, or academic freedom. I 
do not propose to defend religious (or any other) 
encroachments on academic freedom. Some of them--past 
and present--simply cannot be justified. 
Certain practices might be supported by the claim that 
. religious commitment serves academic goals and therefore 
may legitimately qualify academic freedom. That may 
well be so, although all such qualifications face the danger 
of becoming self-def eating at some point for academic 
institutions. But I don't wish to add to that long-standing 
discussion here. Instead, I'll suggest two ways in which 
religious commitment nurtures academic excellence by 
supporting academic freedom. My remarks focus on the 
Christian religious tradition--with which I am most 
familiar--but their application goes beyond church-related 
institutions. 
TRUTH SEEKING 
The first way in which religious commitment supports free 
inquiry is by emphasizing truth seeking. This key 
component of the Christian religious tradition 
straightforwardly allies it with the most influential modern 
thinking about free inquiry and expression. In On Liberty, 
for example, John Stuart Mill bases his defense of absolute 
freedom of expression on the value of truth and the 
imperative to seek it. 
Why isn't it obvious that religions professing to seek the 
truth, a task served by open inquiry, have a strong interest 
in academic freedom? One explanation comes 
immediately to mind: ironically, strong religious 
commitment is often suspected of being weak on academic 
inquiry precisely because of its dedication to truth. To 
profess to have the truth (as religions do, after all) is, one 
might suppose, to offer grounds for not continuing to look 
for it, or to ask questions. Such an approach has too 
commonly been characteristic of strong religious 
commitment--both in and outside the academy. 
The approach pointedly fails, of course, to take sufficient 
account of uncertainty. One can do no better here than to 
quote Mill: All silencing of discussion, he writes, is an 
assumption of infallibility. To shut of the airing of the 
alternative views on grounds that the truth is known is 
implicitly to claim certainty. But Mill's reminder about 
fallibility does not constitute an external restraint on the 
Christian religious tradition as institutionally expressed. 
The notion of human weakness--including epistemic 
weakness--is as central to the Christian tradition as any 
idea. Insofar as the possibility of being mistaken motivates 
free inquiry in the pursuit of truth, such inquiry might be 
a hallmark of the Christian tradition and its institutions of 
learning. 
So the Christian tradition--and, by extension, the learning 
institutions associated with it--has internal reasons for 
allowing free discussion, even of its own basic truth claims. 
But it is not only when people suspect they might be 
mistaken that they ought to welcome questioning; even 
confidently held true beliefs require it. Mill argues that our 
highest intellectual ideal is not simply to hold true beliefs, 
but to hold them in a certain way: 
"Even if the received opinion be ... the whole truth; unless 
it be suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and 
earnestly contested, it will...be held in the measure of a 
prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its 
rational grounds. And not only this, but...the meaning of 
the doctrine itself will be lost or enfeebled, and deprived of 
its vital effect on the character and conduct." 
The approach Mill recommends seems crucial to fostering 
active, engaged learning that will result in lives of 
informed service. If religious commitment, as I said above, 
stresses the need to seek truth, it would benefit as well 
from the rigorous free discussion Mill advocates. 
My argument that religious commitment supports academic/ 
freedom through its emphasis on truth seeking can be read 
two ways: that it does so in principle, or that it does so. in 
common practice. If read primarily in the first way, my
argument will be understood to promote free inquiry 
religious grounds. This might seem to be a bizarre sort 
preaching to the choir, since readers of Academe are, 
and large, in little need of persuasion that free inquiry is 
good idea. But active religious support for free inquiryi 
I think, more common than many people suppose--now 
in history. Even if it is not, mentioning the religi 
argument for greater academic freedom reminds us, at 
very least, that we need not choose between our religiou 
commitment and our academic ideals. 
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FOUNDATIONS FOR FREE INQUIRY 
The final point I wish to make goes one step further: 
religious commitment may be more than merely congenial 
to our academic ideals--it may be the foundation for them. 
Ideals of free inquiry and expression come to us from a 
political tradition that has, in the estimation of some, fallen 
on hard times. A core aspiration of this tradition is 
content-neutral institutional policies (those that, for 
example, treat all religions in the United States or all ideas 
in the academy equally). It is especially important, in the 
liberal tradition, for policies to be neutral about substantive 
claims of value or the nature of persons. But their need to 
be so gives rise to a certain paradox, because justifying 
liberal institutional policies requires an appeal to specific 
claims about persons and value. 
One response to this paradox has been to reject liberal 
policies--either because neutrality is impossible, or because 
the claims about the autonomy of persons that traditionally 
ground them are deemed false. But rejecting such policies 
is not an attractive option for defenders of academic 
freedom. If it's impossible to make policies that are 
neutral all the way down, the alternative is to defend 
policies that are neutral in practice on the basis of 
substantive commitments about persons and values. The 
religious commitments that give rise to the liberal tradition 
are certainly not the only basis for doing so, but they are an 
important one. 
The defense of academic freedom demands a foundation. 
Personal. and institutional religious commitment provides 
one--not uniquely, but unquestionably. Nicholas 
Wolterstorff eloquently expresses this idea in his article in 
this issue of Academe when he argues that the abridgement 
of academic freedom constitutes a profound violation of 
the person. In this world of ours, he writes, there's nothing 
of greater worth than persons, and correspondingly, no 
greater evil than the violation of persons. The violation of . 
a person is the desecration of one of the images of God. 
Injustice in the name of religion has, tragically, been as 
common inside the academy as outside of it. But to really 
make a stand in opposition to injustice, we need religion-­
or something very like it. Providing such support is 
potentially the greatest contribution of religious 
commitment to academic excellence and to the policies that 
promote and defend it. This contribution should not go 
unrecognized; nor should it be allowed to remain a mere 
possibility where it is as yet unrealized. 
torm Bailey is assistant professor of philosophy at Luther College in Decorah, Iowa. 
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CAN A CHRISTIAN BE A JOURNALIST? 
A Case for Affirming Journalism as a Calling 
Catherine McMullen 
January 1998: I was in my office, minding my own business, 
when Ernie Mancini called. Ernie, who runs the alumni 
office at Concordia, wanted me to travel with other faculty 
to Minneapolis to teach one-day courses for alumni. 
As will come as no surprise to those who know him, Ernie 
was enthusiastic--so enthusiastic that I forgot my vow to 
practice saying the N word. ''What would I talk about, 
Ernie?" I asked. 
''I've already got that figured out, Cathy," he said. "Here's 
the title: 'Can a Christian Be a Journalist?'" 
.''Cath, you still there?" 
Ultimately I did say no-due to scheduling conflicts, not the 
question. But for a long time after Ernie's call I asked 
myself: 
What on earth kind of question was that? It sounded to me 
as absurd as "Can a French professor be a Christian?" or 
"Can a Christian be an auto mechanic?" Why did he pose 
the question? I wondered. Of course, he posed the question 
because Ernie, a passionate advocate for journalism, knew 
how I would answer it. But at the time I was pretty 
defensive, as journalists tend to be. Has my beloved 
discipline and profession truly descended to the point where 
people assume no one of faith could possibly become a 
journalist? Are we, as Jim Lehrer fears, "down there with 
the lawyers, the Congress and the child pornographers in the 
publics' respect and esteem" (65)? 
I have continued to think about Ernie's question for several 
years now, for several reasons: I thought about it as we 
developed a print journalism major at Concordia and were 
compelled to try articulate how journalism might be taught 
at a liberal arts college of the church. I thought about it 
during the last two or three years of what an editorial in 
Christianity Today called an "epidemic of journalistic 
felonies" (''When Lies Become News" 42). I think about it 
every day I teach journalism class and struggle to show my 
students that journalism is worth their best efforts and my 
insistence on excellence because it is noble work, blessed 
work, and as essential to our republic as the voting booth. 
Sometimes this is a tough sell. Watergate and the Pentagon 
Papers called journalists of my generation to the profession 
and showed us that we really could change the world. To my 
students, these landmark stories are ancient history. They 
grew up in the era of the sound bite, in a time when a 
frightening number of Americans get their news not just 
from TV, but from late-night comics. They grew up in a 
post-modem age wherein all institutions are distrusted, 
including the one whose job it has long been to serve as 
watchdog on the others. And as anyone who cares about 
journalism knows, it's been a rough couple of years. The 
year 1998-when we were in the middle of planning our 
program--was for journalists annus horribilus: 
In June 1998, The Cincinnati Enquirer ran a front-page 
apology to Chiquita Brands because one of its reporters 
had stolen thousands of messages from the company's 
voice-mail system. 
Also in June, CNN and Time admitted they didn't have 
proof for their story alleging that the US military had used 
nerve gas to kill American defectors in Laos during the 
Vietnam War. Correspondent Peter Arnett got his hands 
slapped; two producers got fired. 
The Boston Globe.fired a gifted columnist, Patricia Smith, 
for making up quotations and people in her columns. A few 
months later, it fired its most popular columnist, Mike 
Barnicle, for the same offense. 
The �ew Republic fired young hotshot reporter, Stephen .. 
Glass, for a long list of lies. He made up quotations. He 
made up sources. He made up statistics and other "facts. " 
And then, of course, came the situation that writer Jon Katz 
calls "a media recipe from hell": 
Take the Washington press corps. Add the leaky, 
backstabbing Washington political and legal communities. 
Fold in round-the-clock cable news channels with endless 
hours to fill. Blend with gabby, vain lawyers and reporters 
eager to appear on TV. Top with a sexually enthusiastic 
president. Flavor with a needy, opportunistic young Whit
House intern. Then toss in Matt Drudge and the Worl 
Wide Web. It's a mixture guaranteed to make us all los 
our appetites. (28) 
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Those of us who were then planning the print journalism 
program were still hungry, but for more substantial fare. So 
we asked variations on Ernie's question: Does such a 
proposed program fit the mission of the college? What is the 
relationship between Christian faith and journalism? What 
is, for me, the relationship between my.love of God and my 
love of journalism? What tenets of my faith are also tenets 
of my profession? How can I-as a Christian, a journalist, 
a teacher-instill in my students a passion for journalism not 
tempered by, but driven by, Christian faith? 
Those are the questions I've been thinking about for the last
few years. The answers to some of these questions might
seem obvious; others are far more complex and will
never-perhaps should never-be answered definitively. But
I know now what I would. tell those Twin City Cobbers
should Ernie re-issue his invitation: I would tell them about
David Nimmer, a journalism professor at the University of
St. Thomas who begins his classes by asking, "Are you
ready to do God's work?" I would tell them that most of the
journalists I know consider themselves to be people of faith,
and that many are active in their churches. l would tell them
that despite the huge salaries paid the talking heads on
morning TV, most journalists are obscenely underpaid men
and women who cover the school board, the city council, the
Concordia basketball game-and that they see no conflict
whatever between faith and profession. I would tell them
that most journalists are not drawn to the newsroom by
glamour, prestige or fat paychecks-and those who are
suffer rude awakenings. Most journalists still hold with the
old newsroom adage that the purpose of journalism is to
comfort the afflict.eel and afflict the comfortable. I would tell
them that many journalists are called by their well-honed
senses of moral outrage at ittjustice .and cruelty, and by their
unshakable faith in the healing power of words and the
liberating illumination of truth. They are called by their
· desire to help people honor their obligations to care for one
· another by pointing out human needs, desires, failures and
triumphs.
I would tell them that most journalists begin their careers
· saying "yes"to Dave Nimmer's question-even if they would
be embarrassed to admit it. True to Lutheran tradition, we
ave here a paradox: We journalists are accused often
. ough ofbeing arrogant without also claiming to do God's
· ork! And yet it is clear to me that journalism, and hence
society, would be well served by journalists who regard
eir profession as work blessed by God for the good of his
-going creation.
I have come to believe that I could not have become a 
journalist if I did not believe in a God who loves and 
nurtures us, who does not play us like puppets but has given 
us brains, talent and heart to create a world that could work 
if we accepted our responsibilities to Him and to one 
another. Nor could I have become a journalist ifl believed 
that being a Christian means being always pleasant and nice; 
sometimes faith requires us to yell and holler, to upset the 
moneychangers' tables. 
Philosopher Tom Christenson said it perfectly: 
God help us when the word "Christian" has come to mean 
"inoffensive, " "sanitized, " "sexual, " or when Christian 
writers can only write about nice folks in nice towns doing 
nice things for nice reasons, in nice language. The freedom 
of the Christian is, among other things, freedom from the 
suffocating and nauseating law ofniceness. (7) 
In the New Union Prayer Book is a prayer Reform Jews 
pray at Yorn Kippur, the Day of Atonement: "God, You do 
not ask me, 'Why haven't you been as great as Moses?' You 
do ask me. 'Why have you not been yourself? Why have you 
not been true to the best in you?'" (325). 
I believe we can only be true to the best in ourselves when 
we live not in the darkness of fear and ignorance but in the 
light of truth. We can be ourselves when we use the reason 
God gave us. Or, as Luther said: "How dare you not know 
what you can know?" (qtd. in Benne "Integrity" 7). 
I am tempted to hang my journalistic creed on John 8:32: 
''You will know the truth, and the truth will set you free." I 
believe that with all my heart and want to claim it as 
journalism's great commission. Yet I know that if I commit 
the journalistic sin of taking Jesus' words out of context, I 
risk the greater journalistic sin of arrogance. As a wise 
writer has warned: 
Don't snatch at more than your share of biblical sanction 
for your calling ... Jesus was talking about the truth that 
came from commitment to Him and the revelation of God's 
truth that was incarnate in him. He was really not talking 
about the truth that you grub around and find by yourself. .. 
if the truth will make you free, the freedom you are talking 
about is pretty much summed up in the ideal of free people 
in a free society, namely, democratic government. (Baker 
27-28)
Point taken-but a freedom worthy of our efforts! 
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I believe that God desires that we live in community, and 
that community is impossible unless we know about one 
another's fears and joys, tragedies and triumphs. I believe, 
too, that Christ's death and resurrection free us to ask any 
question, seek any information. As Ernie Simmons writes in 
his wonderful book about Lutheran higher education, "The 
freedom of the gospel of God's justifying grace empowers 
faith for free inquiry. We are not saved by our intellectual or 
ideological constructions so that we are free to pursue 
analysis of the world and search for truth wherever it may 
lead" (23-24). 
I believe in the sanctity of words, in'what E.B. White called 
"the truth and worth of the scrawl." In his · book The
Christian as a Journalist, Richard Balcer asks a provocative 
question: "Why did John take the prologue space to his 
Gospel to write a poem about the Logos, the Word? What 
was he trying) to say, to affirm? What religious truth was he 
announcing?" (15) 
Baker says John "intended to back up his chronicle to its 
original beginnings in ·creation: 'In the beginning was the 
Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was 
God.'" Baker continues: 
The passage has strong hints within it that tum the pages 
back to the first passages in the book of Genesis. And, 
turning there, we find another strange apostrophe to the 
Word A simple line introduces each of the acts of creation: 
'AND GOD SAID ... The act of verbalizing obviously had
some strong religious meaning to these writers. Perhaps a 
fascination with the gift of language. Perhaps some insight 
into the inseparability of personality and verbalization (15-
16). 
Baker points out 'lhe Bible began in the beginning with God 
and his utterance." He continues: 
Utterance is the business of journalism, and utterance is 
originally divine. Not everything that journalism utters is 
divinely inspired by God. There are other bylines in the 
newspapers and other commentators on the air. But the 
fact that the mind shall conceive and bear fruit in utterance 
is a fact that has original religious significance. It is in this 
sense that the journalist, as he engages in his craft, 
partakes of certain holy elements, endowed with 
blessedness from the moment of creation. You do believe in 
the Word, or you are no journalist. (16) 
These beliefs, then, nurtured by my continuing education 
about faith and learning and honed by consideration of what 
is right and wrong with contemporary journalism, led to 
what I believe about the place of journalism at Concordia 
College: First, I believe that the liberal arts truly educate 
journalists rather than merely train reporters. Second, I 
believe that because we are a college of the church we have 
the freedom-as well as the responsibility-to provide 
leadership in journalism ethics and, in the process, to help 
journalism reclaim its role as a public service. Third,.and 
most important, I believe that journalism is more than a 
satisfying career and an essential public service; I believe it 
is a calling, a true vocation, and that its careful and 
thoughtful practice is a way of serving humankind and God. 
Clearly, journalism is an inherently liberal arts profession; 
clearly,. a liberal .education best suits journalists. Journalists 
need to think critically, to know how to formulate a 
hypothesis, how to support claims with rigorous· research, 
and how to present facts in their historical, social and ethical 
contexts. They need to know that the way to get close to the, 
truth about anything is to approach it not from one point of 
view or discipline, but from many. 
A liberal arts college of the church has much to offer 
journalism:· For better or worse, journalists certainly do 
influence the affairs of the world. Journalism can only 
improve if such influence· is wielded·. by thoughtful and 
informed men and women dedicated to the Christian life: Not 
only does journalism fit our mission; our mission fits 
journalism. 
Before we consider that fit, let us look at a journalism 
program that would not, could not happen at Concordia: ' · 
, so-called "Christian journalism" program at Pat Robertson 
Regent University in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Sheila Do" 
a Regent ·student who served. as editor of the campus n · 
magazine, The Christian, describes the program as 
Bible-based approach to news, looking at contempo 
issues from eternal pers�ectives;' (qt<l. in Fisher par. 4). 
Robertson said the program's goals is "to rebuild the 
righteousness around America ... despite the ridicule, d 
the slander, despite the plans to assuage and cut off' 
message" and to "advance the kingdom of God in all 
of journalism" (qt<l. in Fisher par. 26). 
The problems inherent in such an approach are myriad. 
one big problem has emerged that caught Regent Unive 
by surprise: The program seems unable to reach the g 
"advancing the kingdom of the Lord in all 
journalism." That's because the vast majority of It 
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journalism students conclude thatjournalism is inherently 
immoral, that 'journalism is simply no place for a Christian" 
(Fisher par. 6). As a result, most Regent journalism 
graduates either abandon the profession or gravitate toward 
"Christian" media. 
How Regent's notion of "Christian journalism" translates 
into news stories was seen in a 1998 cover story in The 
Christian. It's worth a close look, for it shows us that the 
road to journalistic hell is paved with good intentions. The 
story focuses on vampire and Satanic cults in Tidewater 
Virginia. It quotes detectives, clergy and religion professors 
about what the story's headline calls ''the evil that lurks in 
the darkness" (qui. in Fisher par. 5). If a mainstream news 
,rter had turned in such a story, an editor worth her salt 
· ttly:say:."Great. You'vegothalfa story. Now. Do
:rerei,orting. Balance it. Let's hear from a witch, a
... · " , a Satanist, a former Satanist. Honor the 
inteiligeiice. of the •readers by giving them the information 
they need to form.their own opinions." A Lutheran editor 
might say: "How dare you not find out what you can find 
outr' But The Christian 's reporter diclli'tattemptto speak 
to those sources. Dom said interviewing such people would 
have been unchristian because they are evil and that 
Christian journalists should not give them a platform from 
which to spew Satan's lies. 
Another editor of The Christian says he does not read 
newspapers or news magazines or watch TV news. He 
explained: "The media will always be the viewpoint of the 
world, not of God ... You have to be aware of Satan's 
schemes." (qtd. in Fisher par. 14). He thinks good 
journalists · should never portray Christians in a negative 
light, because to do so would defy the will of God. Further, 
many Regent students regard as unchristian any story that 
causes hurt feelings, shame, embarrassment or anger. In 
essence, they tend to believe-to the dismay of some of their 
professors-that their calling to promote their beliefs 
overrides all other considerations in reporting and writing 
new stories. 
If we take that thinking to its logical conclusion, it would be 
acceptable-preferable-to commit the very kinds of 
journalistic felonies that most bother the public-to lie by 
omission, distort facts, fix quotes, and interview only those 
sources whose points of view mirror one's own. 
The Regent program reminds me of an analogy drawn by 
Robert Benne, Jordanffrexler Professor of Religion at 
Roanoke College. He was talking about the need for colleges 
of the church to be academically rigorous and he said: "A 
Christian cobbler makes good shoes, not poor shoes with 
little crosses on them" ("Integrity" 7). 
Good journalism is ethically sound journalism; many of the 
offenses that anger the public and erode their trust in the 
press are the result not of Journalism but of lousy 
journalism. Mel Mencher, a Lou Grant-type editor who now 
teaches in the graduate journalism program at Columbia 
University, is famous for his curmudgeonly sayings. My 
favorite: "It is immoral not to be excellent in your craft" 
(28). 
That means that teaching journalism ethics is inseparable 
from teaching the craft of journalism; yes, we need to 
educate students in ethical decision-making, but the first 
ethical rule is this: Make good shoes. Good journalistic 
stories are well written, well attributed. Good journalism is 
balanced journalism; good reporters know not only to 
present the views of both sides, but that most stories have 
four or six or eight sides. Good journalism is accurate 
journalism-accurate in fact, spelling, grammar, quotation, 
attributions and context. Good journalism sometimes 
enrages people; good journalism does not have to be 
offensive; but a news story. that offends no one is not 
necessarily good journalism. Unbalanced, slanted news 
stories are badly reported news stories; sometimes, what 
their writers need is not so much a remedial course in ethics 
but a refresher of Journalism 101. 
What, exactly, does a college of the church have to offer 
journalism in terms of leadership in ethical decision-making? 
And what about "Christian ethics" would make for better 
journalism? For that matter, what are "Christian ethics" 
anyway, and how do they look different from other ethics? 
And is there such a thing as a Lutheran ethic? 
For those of us who are not theologians, trying to define 
Christian ethics feels like trying to nail Jell-0 to the wall. So 
although I will attempt no explication, let me frame the rest 
of the discussion with some thoughts on Christian ethics by 
the authors Harmon Smith and Louis Hodges. 
The define ethics as ''the search for some kind of rational 
coherence in the regulation of conduct; it is the human actor 
'getting wise to himself' (13). The write that "ethics as a 
systematic discipline is born when we being to reflect 
rationally and systematically upon characteristic ways of 
deciding moral questions" (13). 
The study of Christian ethics, then, is ''the study of the 
implications for human conduct of the reality embodied in 
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Jesus, the reality of God's love for man. To study Christian 
ethics is to ask what are the consequences for human 
behavior of the fact of God's love for man" (30). 
These authors point out that very often the actions of 
Christians do not look different from others. Indeed, they tell 
us that "when the emperor Constantine adopted Christianity 
and found military success fighting under the sign of the 
Christian cross he had all his troops baptized, but with their 
sword-yielding arm held out of the water!" (13). 
Still, they identify four characteristics of the Christian ethic. 
First, it is an "acknowledging ethic," a "responsive ethic" 
(16). That is, humans acknowledge the will of God and 
responds to it. We try to discover what God wills and then 
we consider that to be our duty. As Christians we claim that 
the nature of humankind and of humankind's duty-i.e., the 
nature of God's will for humanity-is seen through the life 
and work of Jesus of Nazareth, who embodied God's will 
and thus shows humanity the content of that will. "It is 
precisely to that content," they write, "that the Christian is 
to respond morally" (17). 
The Christian ethic is also a "corporate ethic" (Smith 19), a 
community ethic. Smith says "to talk about the Christian 
ethic ... is not to talk primarily of some list of new rules or 
of divinely given discursive truths. It is rather to participate 
in a new way of life, to become part of a new reality, the 
church ... [The] result of God's activity is not new rules but 
new people living in new community" (20). 
Third, the Christian ethic is "a deciding ethic," meaning that 
the characteristic that distinguishes humans is our ability to 
think, "I ought." ... Humans then may choose to be either 
moral (righteous) or immoral (unrighteous) but can never 
choose to be amoral. To assert that human are moral beings 
living in a moral environment is to claim "that man is to be 
understood primarily in terms of his relationships to God" 
(22-25). 
Finally, the authors identify a fourth element of the Christian 
ethic as love, agape-the love of someone not because of 
who he is, nor because of what he is, but simply that he is; 
the love demonstrated in the life and death of Jesus Christ" 
(25). In sum, Harmon and Smith write, "Christian love is 
none other than the very giving of the self in service to the 
neighbor." The distinctive character of Christian love lies 
not so much in what it demands that one do as in the reasons 
for making those demands" (26). 
And here is what especially resonated with me, for it points 
out the inseparability of journalism ethics and journalistic 
calling: The authors write that "Christian ethics is not a 
study of codes of ethics but of ways Christians go about 
deciding. The unique ingredient in the acts of Christians does 
not inhere in the nature of the thing done, but rather in the 
reason for doing that thing" (16). 
And yes, indeed, there is a Lutheran ethic, here articulated 
by Benne in discussing four orders to which the Christian is 
called: marriage and family, work, public life and church: 
Lutheran ethics maintains that these are the places in 
which all humans are given the obligations to live 
responsible lives. Christians, moreover, are to see them as 
divinely given callings in which to exercise their particular 
gifts for the sake of the neighbor ... They are the places in 
which we discern our special mission in life, our callings. 
(15) 
Benne 's words are helpful in considering journalism as a 
Christian calling, a Lutheran calling. Smith and Hodge's 
discussion is helpful when considering the nature of 
journalism-the nature of news itself Every journalist will 
tell you about being accused of being part of a vast 
conspiracy to "sell newspapers by printing bad news." I 
know an editor from Iowa who has a running argument with 
a friend. When they meet for lunch once a month, the friend 
begins the conversation by ragging on the editor for all the 
"bad news" in the newspaper. Finally, one day, the editor's 
friend surprised him: "Great paper, today," he said, 
"Finally-some good news in the newspaper!" He was 
referring to a front-page story about some teenager heroes. 
It seems a nW1 was walking in a parking ramp when she was 
mugged. The teenagers saw the mugging and rushed to the 
nun's aid. They held the muggers until police arrived and 
were now being lauded as heroes. "Good news?" the editor 
replied. "Maybe. But remember-first the nun had to get 
mugged." 
Richard Baker puts it another way: 
The journalist is obsessed by matters of moral significance. 
Sometimes the ethical responsibility of journalism is seen 
by reversing lenses. You read in your journal that a mother 
has abandoned her baby. "I had to do it, " she is quoted. 
"The baby is better dead than lookingforward to the kind 
of life I could provide. "How does it happen that the story 
got into the newspaper? Why is it news? In a negative way, 
the moral truth is affirmed that infanticide is wrong. 
Suppose you belonged to a culture that found no moral 
offense in infanticide and a kind of prudent virtue in the 
explanation that the mother gave. The story would never 
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have made the newspapers. It would have had no moral 
meaning. All the time, journalism tips it hand in moral 
matters and reveals what it considers just and good by 
what it presents as wrong. (34-35) 
Articulating the "moral nature of news" is one of the ways 
in which teach future journalists about ethics. This is 
certainly possible at secular institutions, but at 
Concordia-here's another Lutheran paradox-our freedom 
to speak about morality openly and loudly makes focusing 
on ethics imperative. We do this by studying ethical issues 
in journalism and analyzing the cause and effect of 
journalistic decisions. We do this not only by requiring a 
class in journalism ethics-something only half of all 
American journalism programs demand�but also by 
placing ethical discussions front and center in each and 
every journalism class we teach. 
We do this by working on case studies,. and by providing 
formal training in ethics theory; But that's not enough. We 
have to provide moral leadership. A surprisingly large 
number of studies indicate that though most news 
organiz.ations have well-reasoned codes of ethics, too often 
they are either not followed in · crisis situations or are 
undennined by lack of personal morality. As Robert Bugeja 
says in a recent article in Quill magazine: 
Case studies don 't work because students with 
underdeveloped value systems and little if any professional 
experience are being asked to evaluate professionals in 
crisis situations. Ethics are about motive rather than 
sequence, circumstance or setting (15). 
"Ethics are about motive." That's precisely where calling 
comes in, where journalism becomes vocation. 
"Ethics are about motive." That's what Richard Baker is 
getting at when he talks about the "seemingly secular" 
profession of journalism: 
You will not find the temples of Journalistic activity exactly 
reeking with the incenses of sanctity. There· will be no 
morning devotions as reporters, editors and broadcasters 
march out to serve the Lord in their daily lives and work. 
References to the Deity will be heard frequently, but not in 
the context of worship and praise. Journalism places its 
functionaries so close to the raw edges of current history 
that you will tend to find yourself steeped in the attitudes of 
doubt and unbelief Yours is a secular world, often sordid 
and profane. 
Trailing a narcotics peddler through the playground, 
taking notes that tum your stomach at the trial of a rapist­
ki ller-are these the ways to serve your God and fellow 
man? Is there any religious meaning in the life of a 
Journalist, any ethical meaning? Does God call anybody to 
this kind of vocation? The answer to cill these questions has 
to be yes. The man who stands on the communications 
bridge, seeing, observing, telling man the story of himself, 
is one of God's most prized servants. Perhaps it's an ugly 
story; perhaps the Journalist's world appears possessed by 
evil. Nevertheless, the Journalist's work is a vocation, a 
response to a divine call, a coming to attention before 
commands that are for him absolute and ultimate. ( 13-14) 
"Ethics are about motive." When the only motive for 
engaging in journalism is increasing the profits for 
stockholders, we are in trouble. No longer, then are 
journalism's commands absolute and ultimate. They're on 
the auction block. As in any profession, journalism has in its 
ranks practitioners who are careless, incompetent, dishonest, 
and unable to view the world without their own distorting 
filters. But to blame most reporters and editors for the 
profession's lapses is like blaming foot soldiers for having 
lousy generals. The college of the church has another ethical 
responsibility: To remind the industry of their responsibility 
as public servants. 
That's the thesis of a book by Jeremy lggers, Good News, 
Bad News: Journalism Ethics and the Public Interest: 
The fundamental question of journalism ethics-How do we 
best realize the goal of enabling citizens to participate 
more folly in democratic life? -has been replaced by the 
market-driven question, 'How do we meet what our reader 
and marketer-customers say are their information and 
entertainment needs? (78) 
The main problem afflicting much of the media is an unholy 
blend of new technologies and increased competition driven 
by profit-greedy, mega-media corporate owners-a problem 
not easily.solved by journalism curricula or codes of ethics. 
The Presidential scandal story serves as an example. It was 
the first major news story broken by an Internet gossip 
mongerer, Matt Drudge, whose half-truths and wild claims 
were then discussed on 24-hour cable news channels as 
though they were substantiated facts. Soon, reputable news 
organizations repeated the gossip. In the early weeks of the 
story, both airwaves and news columns were lousy with 
rumor, innuendo, and unattributed quotes from vague 
sources. Network TV reporters spewed seamy details and 
"eyewitness accounts" as if they were sworn courtroom 
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testimony instead of error-riddled leaks. Newspapers, which 
had a glorious opportunity to remedy TV's careless 
immediacy with careful, thorough reporting, joined the 
rumor orgy. Even such respected newspapers as The New 
York Times and the Washington Post repeated allegations 
prefaced with "if true"-allegations that later had to be 
retracted. Steve Coz, editor of The National Enquirer, said 
he did not know how his publication would handle the story. 
"It's pretty hard to out-tabloid the mainstream press on this 
one," he said. Writes Hamill: 'We had some turning point in 
American journalism: The president of the United States was 
being examined with the tools usually reserved for the likes 
· ofJoey Buttafuoco" (13).
As soon as the dust settled, journalists began flagellating
themselves with whips of remorse. 'Where Did We Go
Wrong?" asked the Columbia Journalism Review. We went
wrong when we forgot the things we learned in Journalism
l O l : Attribute all information, especially that of a
controversial nature. Double-check. Then check again.
Avoid anonymous sources, but if you must use them, know
which axe they hope to grind and verify the facts with at
least two other sources. Remember that you are reporters,
not judge and jury. There is no honor in. being first and
wrong, but much in being late and right. We went wrong
when we began to think of journalism ethics as unaffordable
luxuries to be tossed aside in the heat of competition, when
we started telling ourselves the word "alleged" gave us
license to make any charge, repeat any accusation. We went
wrong when, despite a multitude of readership surveys to the
contrary, cost-cutting publishers decided the public doesn't
really want in-depth reporting, but distraction and titillation.
But the press didn't suddenly "go wrong" in the White
House story. Public opinion polls over the last twenty years
have reflected a steady decline in the public's trust of
journalists--TV journalists especially, but also their print
counterparts. It is not coincidental that the public trust began
to wane about the same time that newspapers, television
stations and networks began to fall into the hands of fewer
and larger owners, including many multi-media
conglomerates, whose demand for higher returns on
investment slashed newsroom budgets across the country.
Former Chicago Tribune editor James Squires calls
newspapers "the most profitable legal business in America"
(qtd. in Hamilton and Krimsky 24); among publicly owned
and group owned media companies, profit margins of 20
percent are common, and margins of less than the 1992
average of 16 percent are considered unacceptable (24).
Thorough and insightful reporting is an expensive
proposition. Why send a team of reporters to Rwanda when 
syndicates will sell you canned features for a fraction of the 
cost? Why bother with pricey and pesky documentaries if 
the public will watch Barbara Walters dance La Vida Loca 
with Ricky Martin? 
News editors, fearful of ratings and declining subscriptions 
and under the gun from corporate headquarters to increase 
profits, tend to overreact to. the vagaries of readership 
surveys and focus groups. They might well heed the words 
of journalist Eric Blair-better known to the world as 
George Orwell: "Freedom is the right to tell people what 
they do not want to hear." 
A few years ago David Remnick-now editor of The New 
Yorker-wrote about what happens to news coverage when 
journalists fear telling people what they do not want to hear: 
He told about an e-mail sent by the executive editor of the 
Miami Herald to his staff. Here's what he asked them: "If 
anyone has an idea on what to do with the Bosnia story, I 
welcome it. I am embarrassed to say I long ago stopped 
reading this story of enormous human tragedy and 
significant global consequence." The editor said reporters 
had failed to make the. news relevant to the readers, had 
failed to answer readers' questions of "What does this have 
to do with me?" (42) 
Trying to answer such questions only trivializes coverage, 
Remnick says: "Once an editor starts responding to every 
cry of 'What about my needs?' the front page will read like 
a community shopper and the news from Sarajevo will come 
in the form of AP briefs back near the want ads. Like it or 
not, part of the job of a great editor is to listen to public 
desires-and then, if necessary, act against them" (42). 
Muchis at stake. In his memoir, A Reporter's Life, Walter 
Cronkite writes that modem journalism, especially 
television, has become so corrupted by · the kind of 
"infotainment" owners think the public wants-by the 
"profitable bad ... driving ·out the unprofitable or marginally 
profitable good," that our democracy is in grave danger 
(376). Cronkite writes that "a free unintimidated and 
unregulated press is democracy's early-warning system 
against both the dangers of democracy's own excesses and 
the approach of tyranny," and he charges that contemporary 
journalism too often fails to do its job. Cronkite is especially 
hard on television journalism: "The nation whose population 
depends on the explosively compressed headline service of 
television news can expect to be exploited by the 
demagogues and dictators who prey upon the semi­
informed" (380). 
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Therefore, Cronkite claims, citizens must be educated not to 
rely on television for their news, but to read good 
newspapers, weekly newsmagazines and journals. But if 
Pete Hamill is right, the print media are not doing their jobs, 
either. Hamill is as hard on the medium he loves as Cronkite 
is on his: 
With the usual honorable exceptions, newspapers are 
getting dumber. They are increasingly filled with sensation, 
rumor, press-agent jlackery, and bloated trivialities at the 
expense of significant facts ... Newspapers emphasize drama 
and conflict at the expense of analysis. They cover 
celebrities as if reporters were a bunch of waifs with their 
noses pressed enviously to the windows of the rich and 
famous. (30) 
Cronkite and Hamill agree that education is the only way to 
improve the quality of journalism. The public, they write, 
need to be educated to become discriminating readers and 
viewers. Student journalists need to spend more time 
becoming competent in the basics of journalism: Writing, 
reporting, ethics. And perhaps most importantly, they write, 
media owners need to accept their responsibilities as holders 
of the public trust-which is not to say they should operate 
their businesses as charities. Cronkite writes: "I want them 
to make huge profits in the entertainment area--because I 
want them to pour a sizable share of those profits back into 
news and public affairs" (382). 
The problem is not that reporters want to commit lousy 
journalism. Pete Hamill says that too many publishers think 
of reporters and editors as hopeless romantics, committed to 
the myth of the fearless journalist" (99). "They are actually 
right," Hamill writes. "But they should trust that myth. 
Upon that myth they can build great newspapers that will 
also be healthy businesses. Newspapers need men and 
women with fire in the belly, not a collection of bloodless 
bureaucrats, content to clerk the news" (99). 
Never before have we had a greater need for good 
journalism-and for the owners of media conglomerates to 
reclaim journalism's historic role as an early-warning 
system. In this age of special interest publications and the 
Internet, our society is in dire need of a medium that serves 
not only to reflect a community, but also to build, perhaps 
preserve, Community. 
Cronkite points out that our society's historic belief in the 
marketplace of ideas will be moot if there is no viable 
marketplace: 
Today the person seeking only the football scores of the 
couch potato looking for entertainment-world chitchat is 
usually exposed to some general news headlines while 
thumbing through the paper or waiting out the evening 
news broadcast/ But when there are cable and other high­
tech channels to which they can go directly for their sport 
or entertainment news, even that limited exposure will end. 
(380) 
Cures for what ails journalism are neither quick nor easy, 
and as complex as are the solutions for most social 
problems. Still, there are things we can do-as news 
consumers, as · educators, as journalists-to improve the 
function, value and quality of the press: 
Consumers, rather than mumbling their complaints to 
themselves, can yell and holler when the news media act 
irresponsibly. They can direct their disapproval at the new 
organization and its advertisers; they might be surprised to 
learn how quickly media and their advertisers respond to 
pressure from their customers-and how relatively few 
customers they need to hear from before they do so. An 
editorial in Christianity Today urges readers to criticize, to 
hold the press accountable, but to do so in an accountable 
manner: "For Christians, neither reactionary condemnation 
of the news media nor withdrawal from media interaction are 
adequate responses" (42). 
We in the academy can emphasize, in our journalism 
programs, the core values of journalism 
education-reporting, writing, ethics-based on a solid 
foundation of liberal arts. We in church-related colleges can 
do some passionate preaching about calling-we can 
evangelize, if you will, the gospel of vocation. At Concordia, 
we can make use of our academic freedom not just to teach 
ethics, but also to demonstrate morality. We can prick the 
consciences of the mega-media conglomerates that demand 
high profit margins from their news divisions at the expense 
of quality. We can develop what Winds of Change, a study 
of journalism education commissioned by the Freedom 
Forum, calls "a journalism culture," where journalism's role 
and possibilities are respected and revered (Medsger 120). 
We do this by regarding journalism not as a trade but a 
complex and interdisciplinary subject worth studying, and as 
a profession worthy of our best and brightest students. And 
we make a point of celebrating models of journalistic 
excellence and holding them up to students and the public: 
We could start by telling holding up the story of Dennis 
Williams, Verneal Jimerson and William Rainge. They are 
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three black men who spent twenty years on Death Row after 
having being convicted of the 1978 rape and murder of a 
young white woman and her :fiance. On July 2, 1996, they 
walked out of prison, free, exonerated of the crimes by the 
investigative journalism of three Northwestern University 
students. Their compelling, solid story forced police and 
prosecutors to admit they had botched the case because of 
their eagerness to make arrests. Four men have since been 
arrested and convicted on overwhelming DNA evidence. 
In fact, the No¢twestern students' story prompted-some 
say shamed�the Chicago Tribune to launch its own 
investigative series on injustices, in Illinois' death penalty 
system. So well documented and outrageous were those 
exposed injustices that the Illinois governor has called for a 
· moratorium on all executions in the state and the President
has urged other governors to do the same. Among the other
truths that these stories reveal is that no other institution in
our society-not the government, not the academy, not the
church-is willing or able to do such work. If not
journalists, then who? When the students' professor, David
Protess, was interviewed by the Des Moines Register about
his students' feat, he said this: "I personally think it's
appalling that a college professor and his students should be
the last line of defense for a prisoner before execution" (qui.
in Niederpruem 4).
We celebrate journalism by telling about some of the stories 
for which newspapers have won Pulitzer Prizes in public 
service and investigative journalism, ·and perhaps we read 
from the Pulitzer citations themselves to illustrate journalism 
as vocation: 
To Katherine Boo of The Washington Post, for work that 
disclosed wretched neglect and abuse in the city's group 
homes for the mentally retarded, which forced officials to 
acknowledge the conditions and begin reforms. 
To Eric Newhouse of the Great Falls, Montana, Tribune, 
for his vivid examination of alcohol abuse and the 
problems in creates in the community. 
To George Dohrman of the St. Paul Pioneer Press.for his 
determined reporting, despite negative reader reaction, 
that revealed academic fraud in the men 's basketball 
program at the University of Minnesota. 
To Mark Schoofs of the Village Voice, for his provocative 
and enlightening series on the AIDS crisis in Africa. 
The list, thank God, goes on and on, back to 1917. The hope 
is that it continues. 
We can make sure they know-students, the general 
public-why journalists around the world die in the line of 
duty: Pete Hamill reminds us of the hundreds of journalists 
who've been killed covering wars in the last 50 years, 
including 65 who died covering Vietnam: 
They knew thatonly part of the truth could be discovered 
in the safe offices of Washington, D.C.; they had to witness 
the darker truths by getting down in the mud with the 
grunts. Reporters and photographers did not stop dying 
when Vietnam was over. They have been killed in Lebanon 
and Nicaragua, in Bosnia and Peru, and in a lot of other 
places where hard rain falls. 
I can't believe these good men and women died for nothing. 
I know they didn't. They died because they were the people 
chosen by the tribe to carry the torch to the back of the 
cave and tell the others what is there in the darkness. They 
died because they were serious about the craft they 
practiced. They died . because they believed in the 
fimdamental social need for what they did with a pen, a 
notebook, a typewriter, a camera. They didn 't die to 
increase profits for the stockholders. They didn't die to 
obtain an invitation to some. White House dinner for a 
social-climbing pu,blisher. They died for us. 
As readers or journalists, we honor them when we 
remember that their dying was not part of a plan to make 
the world cheaper, baser or dumber. They died to bring us 
the truth (21-22). 
Can an auto mechanic be a Christian? Undoubtedly. Can a 
Christian be a French professor? Oui. And Christian 
cobblers make some fine shoes, too, unadorned with little 
crosses but solid and long lasting and good to the feet. Can 
a Christian be a journaµst? Yes, Ernie, indeed they can. 
Some of them do God's work. 
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